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COYOTE PUBLISHING, INC. v. 
MILLER: BLURRING THE 
STANDARDS OF COMMERCIAL 
AND NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH 
NICOLE E. WOLFE*
It is not easy to describe the present position of legal opinion on 
advertising and free speech.  Only a poet can capture the essence of 
chaos.1
INTRODUCTION
Prostitution is regarded as one of the world’s oldest professions.2
While the sale of sexual services has been in existence for centuries, 
practically every state in the United States has enacted laws that fully 
prohibit it.3  The underlying purposes for creating such laws include 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, 
California; B.A. Political Science and Law, Societies and Justice, University of Washington, Seattle, 
Washington.  I would like to thank the members of the Golden Gate University Law Review
Editorial Board, without whose incredible guidance and expertise this Note would not have been 
published.  Also, an immeasurable thanks to my friends and Matt for their patience and support 
throughout this publication process.  I especially would like to thank my mother, Kathy; stepfather, 
Ian; and brother, Ryan for their never-ending love and encouragement as I pursue my legal career.  
This Note is dedicated to my father, Jim. 
1 R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32 (1977). 
2 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (N.Y. 1978). 
3 Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 596 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
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preventing communicable diseases, averting sexual exploitation of 
women and children, and reducing criminal misconduct associated with 
prostitution.4  Standing alone, the State of Nevada has adopted a nuanced 
approach to the legalized sale of sexual services.5  The motivation 
behind legalizing the commodification of sex is that it will reduce the 
negative health and safety impacts of unregulated and illegal 
prostitution.6  By legalizing prostitution in designated counties, however, 
Nevada prostitution laws have attracted constitutional controversy, more 
specifically the tension between First Amendment free speech rights and 
restrictions on commercial advertising.7  These constitutional issues 
recently came to the forefront in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit. 
In Coyote Publishing, Inc. v. Miller, the Ninth Circuit considered 
the constitutionality of a Nevada statute that regulates commercial 
advertising of legal brothels.8  The Ninth Circuit held that severe 
restrictions on brothel advertising, even in counties where brothels are 
legal, are valid under the First Amendment.9  The court concluded that 
Nevada Revised Statutes sections 201.430(1) and 201.440, which largely 
prohibit the advertising of licensed brothels, met the four prongs of the 
Central Hudson test.10  Although the Ninth Circuit held that Nevada 
Revised Statutes section 201.430(1) was constitutional, the facts of the 
case did not apply to Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) and 
therefore the Ninth Circuit never addressed the constitutionality of this 
portion of the statute.11  Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) 
nevertheless facially restricts more than just purely commercial speech.  
Consequently, section 201.430(2) is overbroad and should be subject to a  
1556 (2011). 
4 See generally Commonwealth v. DeStefanis, 658 A.2d 416 (Pa. 1995). 
5 Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d at 605. 
6 Id.
7 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting right to free speech), with Coyote Publ’g, 598 
F.3d 592 (holding that restrictions on brothel advertising were valid restrictions on speech). 
8 Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d 592. 
9 Id. at 611. 
10 Id. at 602-11.  According to the Supreme Court in Central Hudson, in order for a 
restriction on lawful commercial advertising to be valid there must be a substantial governmental 
interest, the restriction must be narrowly drawn toward that interest, and the restriction must be no 
more extensive than necessary to meet that interest. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
11 Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d 592. Whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision regarding the 
constitutionality of Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(1) was correct is beyond the scope of 
this Note.  This Note solely addresses the constitutionality of Nevada Revised Statutes section 
201.430(2), which the Ninth Circuit did not address because it did not apply to the facts of the case. 
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strict scrutiny analysis, as opposed to the more moderate Central Hudson
test.12
This Note discusses how Nevada Revised Statutes section 
201.430(2) facially restricts more than just purely commercial speech 
and would fail strict scrutiny analysis.13  The Ninth Circuit in Coyote 
Publishing, Inc. v. Miller did not address the constitutionality of this 
section because the facts of the case pertained to advertising of licensed 
brothels, which is regulated by section 201.430(1), as opposed to 
advertising of unlicensed brothels, which is regulated by section 
201.430(2).14  Part I of this Note gives a brief history of prostitution, 
outlines the constitutionality of commercial speech regulations pursuant 
to the Central Hudson test and explains the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Coyote Publishing for concluding that Nevada Revised Statutes section 
201.430(1) applies solely to commercial speech.  Part II argues that 
although the Ninth Circuit held that Nevada Revised Statutes section 
201.430(1) applies solely to commercial speech, section 201.430(2) 
should be invalidated by the doctrine of overbreadth because it regulates 
commercial as well as noncommercial speech.  Finally, Part III proposes 
that a strict scrutiny analysis is the appropriate level of scrutiny to 
analyze Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2).  This Part also 
argues that section 201.430(2) would fail a strict scrutiny analysis 
because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 
I. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROSTITUTION
Prostitution, defined as the act of engaging in sexual activity for 
money or an equivalent, is frequently regarded as “an evil over which the 
legislature has almost plenary power.”15  Throughout the history of the 
United States, many state and municipal laws were passed in an attempt 
to curb the business of prostitution.16  In 1692, Massachusetts passed the 
12 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 557. 
13 The analysis of Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.440 is beyond the scope of this Note.  
The court in Coyote Publishing found section 201.440, which prohibits the advertising of brothels in 
counties where prostitution is illegal, to be constitutionally valid.  Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d at 611.  
This Note solely addresses constitutional issues regarding section 201.430(2). 
14 Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d 592. 
15 State v. Green, 131 P.2d 411, 412 (Ariz. 1942); see also State v. Pascal, 950 A.2d 566, 576 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2008); State v. B Bar Enters., Inc., 649 P.2d 978 (Ariz. 1982). 
16 Jessica N. Drexler, Governments’ Role in Turning Tricks: The World’s Oldest Profession 
in the Netherlands and the United States, 15 DICK. J. INT’L L. 201, 204 (1996) (citing ROBERT T.
3
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ostitution.
first laws that regulated sexual intercourse.17  During the 1800s, more 
laws targeting sexual services were enacted, yet prostitution was still 
tolerated.18  In the early 1900s, criminal sanctions prohibiting 
prostitution were executed at the state level throughout much of the 
United States.19  By 1971, every state, with the exception of Nevada, 
criminalized pr 20
Today, the overwhelming majority of states heavily regulate 
prostitution in an effort to prevent communicable diseases, inhibit sexual 
exploitation, and reduce criminal misconduct associated with the sale of 
sexual services.21  Statutes that regulate and punish the act of prostitution 
and related offenses fall within the police power of the states.22  The 
purpose of these statutes is to protect public health and welfare and to 
prevent criminal activity associated with prostitution.23  However, these 
criminal statutes have not ended the centuries-old practice.24
Recognizing this reality, Nevada is currently the only state that permits 
the sale of sexual services in certain counties.25
Prostitution houses are legal, yet heavily monitored, in eleven of the 
sixteen Nevada counties.26  Nevada counties with more than 400,000 
residents are prohibited from issuing licenses to brothels.27  This includes 
Clark County, where the city of Las Vegas is located.28  Even in counties 
where brothels are legal, the sale of sexual services is still prohibited 
unless it is held in a licensed, designated brothel.29  Among the several 
FRANCOEUR, TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON ISSUES IN HUMAN SEXUALITY 264 (Robert T. 
Francoeur ed., 1987)). 
17 Id. (citing ROBERT T. FRANCOEUR, TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON ISSUES IN 
HUMAN SEXUALITY 264 (Robert T. Francoeur ed., 1987)). 
18 Id. (citing ROBERT T. FRANCOEUR, TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON ISSUES IN 
HUMAN SEXUALITY 264 (Robert T. Francoeur ed., 1987)). 
19 Id. at 204-05 (citing ROBERT T. FRANCOEUR, TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON ISSUES 
IN HUMAN SEXUALITY 264 (Robert T. Francoeur ed., 1987)). 
20 Id. (citing ROBERT T. FRANCOEUR, TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON ISSUES IN 
HUMAN SEXUALITY 264 (Robert T. Francoeur ed., 1987)). 
21 Id. at 205-06. 
22 Moody v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 697 P.2d 1310, 1318 (Kan. 1985). 
23 State v. Schultz, 582 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). 
24 Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 595 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1556 (2011). 
25 Id. at 596. 
26 Id.
27 Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Heller, No. CV-06-329-JCM-PAL, 2007 WL 2254702, at *1 (D. 
Nev. Aug. 3, 2007), rev’d sub nom. Coyote Publ’g v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir, 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011). 
28 Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 596 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1556 (2011). 
29 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.354(1) (Westlaw 2011). 
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restrictions30 on legal brothels are severe limits on the advertising of 
brothels, both where prostitution is illegal and where it is legal.31  These 
restrictions that inhibit advertising are subject to First Amendment 
protections.32
B. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
One of the core principles of the First Amendment is to protect the 
rights of individuals to give and obtain truthful information about lawful 
activities.33  From this principle, the First Amendment prevents the 
government from suppressing speech because of its mere disapproval of 
the message.34  To safeguard the free flow of commercial speech, the 
United States Supreme Court articulated a four-part test to determine the 
constitutionality of restrictions that inhibit purely commercial speech.35
Courts review laws that restrict commercial speech under a specific level 
of intermediate scrutiny referred to as the Central Hudson test.36
1. Defining Commercial Speech 
For First Amendment purposes, commercial speech is defined as an 
expression related to the economic interests of the speaker, generally in 
the form of commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.37
Speech is considered commercial if (1) the speech is admittedly 
advertising, (2) the speech references a specific product, and (3) the 
speaker has an economic motive for the speech.38  Alternatively, speech 
30 Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d at 596.  The restrictions on legal brothels include imposing 
liability on owners of brothels if they knew or should have known that a prostitute has tested positive 
for HIV. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.1397 (Westlaw 2011).  Nevada has also created 
statutory protections in an effort to prevent coercion of the employees by the operators of the 
brothels. For example, section 201.300 makes criminal the act of “pandering,” which includes 
inducing, persuading, encouraging, or enticing a person to engage in the sale of sexual services.  
Additionally, it is a crime for a person to live from the earnings of a sex worker or receive money 
from the proceeds of any prostitute without consideration. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.320 
(Westlaw 2011). 
31 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.440 (Westlaw 2011). 
32 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
33 Brief of Amicus Curiae DKT Liberty Project in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee Coyote 
Publishing, Inc., Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d 592 (No. 07-16633), 2008 WL 1756433 at *2. 
34 Id.
35 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
36 See id.
37 United States v. Bell, 238 F. Supp. 2d 696, 703 (M.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d, 414 F.3d 474 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
38 Am. Acad. of Pain Mgmt. v. Joseph, 353 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983)); see also Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. 
5
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is not commercial if it does not promote the speaker’s product for sale or 
encourage a commercial transaction with the user.39
In order to be classified as commercial, speech must do “no more 
than” propose a commercial transaction.40  In other words, commercial 
speech is an expression that relates solely to the economic interests of the 
speaker and its audience.41  The Ninth Circuit has accepted the Supreme 
Court’s “no more than” criterion when defining commercial speech.42
The Ninth Circuit identified this criterion as follows: “If speech is not 
‘purely commercial’—that is, if it does more than propose a commercial 
transaction—then it is entitled to full First Amendment protection.”43
2. The Central Hudson Test 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Central Hudson governs 
restrictions on commercial speech.  In Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission, a New York electrical utility 
company challenged the constitutionality of a regulation, promulgated by 
the Public Service Commission, that prohibited all advertising that 
promoted the use of electricity.44  The Supreme Court, in finding that the 
ordinance restricted purely commercial speech, formulated a four-step 
test for analyzing the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial 
speech.45  The Court explained that in order for a restriction on 
commercial advertising to be valid, (1) the speech must concern a legal 
activity and must not be misleading, (2) there must be a substantial 
governmental interest to be achieved by the restriction, (3) the restriction 
must be narrowly drawn to advance that interest, and (4) the restriction 
must be no more extensive than necessary to meet that interest.46
Applying this test, the Court found that conserving energy was a 
substantial interest but the Commission’s restriction was more extensive 
than necessary to serve that interest; thus, the regulation was 
Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1994). 
39 New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
40 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 
(1976). 
41 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. 
42 See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001); S.O.C., 
Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 1998). 
43 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Hoffman, 255 
F.3d at 1184). 
44 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558-59. 
45 Id. at 566. 
46 Id. at 564. 
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unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.47
Subsequently, courts analyze laws that regulate purely commercial 
speech for constitutional defects pursuant to the Central Hudson test.  
However, restrictions that inhibit more than purely commercial speech 
are granted full constitutional protection and are subject to a strict 
scrutiny analysis. 
C. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF COYOTE PUBLISHING, INC. V.
MILLER
In March of 2006, Shady Lady Ranch, a licensed brothel, wished to 
place an advertisement in both High Desert Advocate and Las Vegas 
CityLife, two newspapers that were circulated in Nevada.48  Coyote 
Publishing, Inc., a Nevada corporation that owned High Desert Advocate
and Las Vegas CityLife, wanted to run the advertisement.49  The 
newspapers circulated in counties where brothels were legal, as well as 
counties where brothels were prohibited.50  Due to the provisions of 
Nevada Revised Statutes sections 201.430(1) and 201.440, Las Vegas 
CityLife rejected Shady Lady Ranch’s advertisement out of fear of 
prosecution.51
Section 201.440 prohibits brothel advertising in counties where the 
sale of sexual services is illegal by local or state statute.52  Moreover, 
section 201.430 prohibits certain forms of advertising in counties where 
brothels are permitted.53  Specifically, section 201.430(1) restricts 
individuals acting on behalf of brothels from advertising, section 
201.430(2) restricts advertising of unlicensed brothels, and section 
201.430(3) makes inclusion of locations of brothels in any publication 
prima facie evidence of advertising for the purposes of this section.54
Violation of these advertising statutes may result in criminal penalties, 
including fines and imprisonment.55
47 Id. at 572-73. 
48 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Heller, No. CV-06-329-
JCM-PAL, 2007 WL 2254702 (D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2007), rev’d sub nom. Coyote Publ’g v. Miller, 598 
F.3d 592 (9th Cir, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011). 
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.  Additionally, Shady Lady Ranch wished to advertise in public theaters, streets, and 
highways, in a manner that was prohibited by section 201.430(1).  Id.
52 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.440 (Westlaw 2011). 
53 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(1) (Westlaw 2011). 
54 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(1)-(3) (Westlaw 2011). 
55 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(4) (Westlaw 2011). 
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Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430 in its relevant portion 
states:
1.  It is unlawful for . . . any owner, operator, agent or employee of a 
house of prostitution, or anyone acting on behalf of any such person, 
to advertise . . . any house of prostitution: 
(a) In any public theater, on the public streets of any city or town, 
or on any public highway; or 
(b) In any county, city or town where prostitution is prohibited by 
local ordinance or where the licensing of a house of prostitution 
is prohibited by state statute. 
2.  It is unlawful for any person knowingly to prepare or print an 
advertisement concerning a house of prostitution not licensed for that 
purpose pursuant to NRS 244.345 . . . in any county, city or town 
where prostitution is prohibited by local ordinance or where the 
licensing of a house of prostitution is prohibited by state statute. 
3.  Inclusion in any display, handbill or publication of the address, 
location or telephone number of a house of prostitution or of 
identification of a means of transportation to such a house, or of 
directions telling how to obtain any such information, constitutes 
prima facie evidence of advertising for the purposes of this section. 
4.  Any person, company, association or corporation violating the 
provisions of this section shall be punished . . . by imprisonment in the 
county jail . . . or by a fine . . . or by both fine and imprisonment.56
Coyote Publishing, Inc., and Shady Lady Ranch (collectively 
“Coyote Publishing”) filed a complaint against the Nevada Secretary of 
State, the Nevada Attorney General, and the Clark County District 
Attorney.57  Coyote Publishing challenged sections 201.430 and 201.440, 
alleging that the restrictions violated the First Amendment.58  In a motion 
for summary judgment, Coyote Publishing argued that sections 201.430 
and 201.440 restricted truthful, non-misleading commercial speech and 
that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the statutes met the Central
56 Id.
57 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Heller, No. CV-06-329-
JCM-PAL, 2007 WL 2254702 (D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2007), rev’d sub nom. Coyote Publ’g v. Miller, 598 
F.3d 592 (9th Cir, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011). 
58 Id.
8
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Hudson test.59  The defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss 
and a cross-motion for summary judgment arguing that these statutes 
satisfied the Central Hudson test and were thus constitutional.60
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted 
Coyote Publishing’s motion for summary judgment.61  The district court 
found that sections 201.430 and 201.440 restricted free speech and thus 
were unconstitutional.62  In reaching its decision, the district court stated 
that the definition of “prima facie evidence” contained in section 
201.430(3) reached far more than commercial speech and therefore 
required a strict scrutiny analysis.63  Accordingly, the district court found 
that section 201.430(3) violated the U.S. Constitution because the 
government had neither demonstrated a compelling interest nor shown 
that the statute used the least restrictive means to achieve such an 
interest.64  The court then analyzed the remaining portion of section 
201.430 using the four-part analysis set forth in Central Hudson.65  The 
district court concluded that section 201.430 failed to meet the Central
Hudson test and was thus unconstitutional.66  Subsequently, in 2010, the 
Nevada Secretary of State appealed the grant of summary judgment, and 
the case went before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.67
D. NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING AND REASONING
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and upheld 
the constitutionality of the statutes, finding that both Nevada Revised 
Statutes section 201.430(1) and 201.440 targeted purely commercial 
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Heller, No. CV-06-329-JCM-PAL, 2007 WL 2254702, at *7 (D. 
Nev. Aug. 3, 2007) (order granting summary judgment), rev’d sub nom. Coyote Publ’g v. Miller, 
598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011). 
62 Id. at *3. 
63 Id. at *2-3. 
64 Id. at *3. 
65 Id. at *3-7. 
66 Id. at *7.  The district court rejected the defendants’ argument that advertising of licensed 
brothels in counties that do not allow them will increase illegal prostitution in those counties.  The 
court also found that defendant’s second argument, protecting the county option to ban prostitution, 
was unfounded.  The court relied on Bigelow v. Virginia, which stated that a state may not, “under 
the guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another State from disseminating 
information about an activity that is legal in that State.”  Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824-25 
(1975). 
67 Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1556 
(2011). 
9
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speech.68  As a result, the Ninth Circuit analyzed these statutes using the 
Central Hudson test.69  In reaching this conclusion, the court first stated 
that section 201.430(1) does not burden any significant amount of fully 
protected, noncommercial speech.70  The court noted that because 
section 201.430(1) states that only brothel owners or persons acting on 
behalf of brothel owners are prohibited from advertising, publishers of 
news accounts could not be punished under this portion of the statute.71
Second, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that in Nevada, where laws contain 
statutory language making certain facts “prima facie evidence” of guilt, a 
judge could submit this presumption to the jury only if a “reasonable 
juror on the evidence as a whole . . . could find guilt or the presumed fact 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”72  Thus, the prima facie provision would 
have effect only if the evidence, viewed as a whole, would lead a 
reasonable juror to find that the material was “advertising.”73  The Ninth 
Circuit presumed that a judge would not submit the prima facie 
presumption to the jury in a case involving a newspaper article, because 
a reasonable juror would not conclude that a newspaper article was 
advertising.74  Therefore, the court concluded that section 201.430(1) 
would not apply to newspaper articles or postings on Internet message 
boards by individuals acting independently of brothels.75
Since the Ninth Circuit found that Nevada Revised Statutes sections 
201.430(1) and 201.440 regulated purely commercial speech, the court 
proceeded to analyze the restrictions using the Central Hudson test.76
The Ninth Circuit first acknowledged that prostitution in some counties 
in Nevada was a legal activity and the speech was not misleading.77  It 
then found that Nevada has a substantial state interest in support of 
advertising restrictions.78  According to the Ninth Circuit, the deeply 
rooted notion that “[t]here are, in a civilized society, some things that 
68 Id. at 599. 
69 Id. at 602. 
70 Id. at 599. 
71 Id.
72 Id. (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 47.230(2)). 
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 599 n.9. 
76 Id. at 599. 
77 Id. at 606. It should be noted that prostitution is legal only in designated counties in 
Nevada. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.345 (Westlaw 2011).  In counties where prostitution is 
not legal, the First Amendment extends no protection and the analysis ends.  See Cent. Hudson Gas 
& Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980); Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d at 
606. 
78 Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d at 602-03. 
10
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money cannot buy,” coupled with the prevention of exploitation of 
women and children, justified Nevada’s advertising restrictions.79  The 
court also noted that advertising restrictions “directly and materially 
advance” Nevada’s interest in limiting the commodification of sex 
because they eliminate the public’s exposure and reduce the market 
demand for it.80  Finally, the court concluded that the restrictions on 
advertising were no more extensive than necessary to meet Nevada’s 
interest.81  Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that section 201.430(1) met the 
Central Hudson test and therefore did not violate the First Amendment.82
Although the Ninth Circuit reached a conclusion regarding the 
constitutionality of section 201.430(1), it did not address the 
constitutionality of section 201.430(2), which regulates advertising of 
unlicensed brothels, because the facts of the case pertained to advertising 
of licensed brothels.83
II. ARGUMENT
Since Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) applies to 
unlicensed brothels, the Ninth Circuit did not address its constitutionality 
and instead held that section 201.430(1), as applied to the facts in Coyote
Publishing pertaining to a licensed brothel, was constitutional.84
Nevertheless, section 201.430(2) is overbroad because it restricts both 
commercial and noncommercial speech.  If High Desert Advocate and 
Las Vegas CityLife, the two newspapers in Coyote Publishing,
independently published an article that referenced unlicensed brothels as 
opposed to licensed brothels, section 201.430(1) would not apply.85
Instead, these newspapers would face sanctions pursuant to section 
201.430(2) even though they were not acting on behalf of a brothel.86
Since Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) restricts both 
commercial and noncommercial speech, it is subject to a strict scrutiny 
analysis because fully protected speech is inhibited by the construction of 
the statute.87  As a result, section 201.430(2) should be invalidated 
79 Id. at 602-05. 
80 Id. at 608. 
81 Id. at 610. 
82 Id. at 610-11. 
83 See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011). 
84 Coyote Publ’g, 598 F.3d at 602-03. 
85 See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(1) (Westlaw 2011). 
86 See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011). 
87 See generally Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
496-97 (1982); United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1309 (D. Utah 2003). 
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because the statute is not narrowly tailored and consequently cannot 
withstand a strict scrutiny analysis. 
A. NEVADA REVISED STATUTES SECTION 201.430(2) SHOULD BE
DEEMED INVALID BECAUSE IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
OVERBROAD
Section 201.430(2) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it 
restricts both noncommercial speech as well as commercial speech.  
Restrictions that target unprotected speech are unconstitutionally 
overbroad if they also control types of protected speech or press 
activity.88  Overbroad restrictions on speech that carry criminal sanctions 
are “particularly repugnant” unless they are drawn with narrow 
specificity.89  The test is “whether the challenged provisions . . . burden 
no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government 
interest.”90  Thus, statutes that criminalize a significant amount of 
constitutionally protected speech may be deemed unconstitutionally
overbroad even if they carry some legitimate applications.91
1. The Overbreadth Doctrine Is Appropriate 
The doctrine of overbreadth is usually inapplicable to statutes that 
regulate purely commercial speech.92  The rationale behind this is that 
commercial expression is less likely to be deterred by overbroad 
regulation and is “more hardy, less likely to be ‘chilled,’ and not in need 
of surrogate litigators.”93  The exception to this rule applies to 
regulations of purely commercial speech that could potentially affect 
noncommercial speech.94
88 See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
89 State v. Hauge, 547 N.W.2d 173, 176 (S.D. 1996). 
90 Id. (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994)). 
91 State v. Kilburn, 84 P.3d 1215, 1221 (Wash. 2004). 
92 See generally Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
496-97 (1982); United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1309 (D. Utah 2003). 
93 Desnick v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 665 N.E.2d 1346, 1353 (Ill.1996) (quoting Bd. of 
Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989)). 
94 State by Spannaus v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 740-41 (Minn. 1981); see
also Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (holding that the rule 
that overbreadth challenges cannot be brought against commercial speech regulations was 
inapplicable when the issue was whether the manner in which an ordinance regulated solicitations 
also intruded upon the rights of fully protected speech). 
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Restrictions that target commercial speech but also inhibit 
noncommercial speech are subject to an overbreadth analysis.95  For 
example, in Spannaus v. Century Camera, a Minnesota state law 
provided that “[n]o employer or agent thereof shall directly or indirectly 
solicit or require a polygraph.”96  The Minnesota Supreme Court found 
that while this law targeted commercial speech, the terms “solicit or 
require” also had the potential to inhibit noncommercial speech, such as 
an employer’s letter to the editor of the local newspaper on the subject of 
polygraph testing.97  Because of this potential danger, the court 
recognized that Spannaus was not a commercial speech case and found 
that the overbreadth doctrine was appropriate.98
Likewise, Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) would 
inhibit a substantial portion of fully protected, noncommercial speech.  
Section 201.430(2) potentially prohibits news articles and Internet 
postings on message boards, both of which are noncommercial in 
nature.99  The relevant portion of section 201.430(2) that affects 
noncommercial speech states, “[i]t is unlawful for any person knowingly 
to prepare or print an advertisement concerning a house of prostitution 
not licensed for that purpose . . . .”100  Section 201.430(3) then states 
“[i]nclusion in any . . . publication of the address, location, or telephone 
number of a house of prostitution, constitutes prima facie evidence of 
advertising for purposes of this section.”101  Therefore, according to the 
statute, publications that include the location of an unlicensed brothel are 
considered to be forms of unlawful advertising.102
As a result, the construction of Nevada Revised Statutes section 
201.430(2) has the potential to inhibit noncommercial speech, such as a 
newspaper or magazine publication.  For example, the statute would 
95 State by Spannaus, 309 N.W.2d at 740-41. 
96 Id. at 738 n.2 (citing MINN. STAT. § 181.75 (1980)). 
97 Id. at 740-41. 
98 Id. at 741. 
99 See, e.g., Ad World, Inc. v. Twp. of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (3d Cir. 1982); 
S.N.J. Newspapers, Inc. v. State of N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 542 F. Supp. 173, 182-83 (D.N.J. 1982) 
(stating that the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of the press protect newspapers); see also
Hays Cnty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a free newspaper 
that dealt with environmental and social justice issues was fully constitutionally protected speech 
even though its publication expenses were covered in part by revenue derived from advertisers); Too 
Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364, 373 (N.J. 2011) (stating that defendant was protected by 
the First Amendment to post her thoughts online). 
100 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011). 
101 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(3) (Westlaw 2011). 
102 Compare NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011), with NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 201.430(3) (Westlaw 2011). 
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affect a newspaper article that covers an unlicensed brothel.  If that 
article mentioned the location or address of an unlicensed brothel, it 
would constitute prima facie evidence of an advertisement pursuant to 
Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(3).103  Under Nevada Revised 
Statutes section 201.430(2), it is unlawful for any person to print an 
advertisement regarding unlicensed brothels.104  The newspaper 
publisher that printed an article that mentioned an unlicensed brothel 
would therefore have to defend their free speech rights to avoid criminal 
sanctions.  Similar to Spannaus,105 because the language of the section 
201.430(2) poses a potential danger of reaching noncommercial speech, 
the doctrine of overbreadth is applicable. 
2. The Doctrine of Overbreadth Applies to Statutes That Intertwine 
Both Commercial and Noncommercial Speech 
The doctrine of overbreadth applies to Nevada Revised Statutes 
section 201.430(2) because this section intertwines both commercial and 
noncommercial speech.  A law or ordinance may be facially 
unconstitutional if it prohibits “such a broad range of protected conduct 
that it is unconstitutionally ‘overbroad.’”106  In general, a party has 
standing to vindicate only his or her own constitutional rights.107
However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception 
to this general rule for laws that are written so broadly that they may 
affect the protected speech of third parties.108
If commercial speech is “inextricably intertwined” with 
noncommercial speech, a court may not parse out the protected and 
unprotected parts of the speech.109  In S.O.C., Inc v. County of Clark, the 
Ninth Circuit found that a county ordinance prohibiting off-premises 
canvassing in public streets and sidewalks within the Las Vegas resort 
district was overbroad because it restricted commercial speech that was 
intertwined with noncommercial speech.110  The ordinance did not 
103 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(3) (Westlaw 2011). 
104 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011). 
105 State by Spannaus v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 735 (Minn. 1981). 
106 Members of the City Council of the City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 
796 (1984). 
107 S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir.1998); Members of City 
Council of the City of L.A., 446 U.S. at 796. 
108 S.O.C., Inc., 152 F.3d at 1142 (citing Members of City Council of the City of L.A., 446 
U.S. at 798). 
109 Id. at 1144 (citing Perry v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 121 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
110 Id.
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contain any limiting language such as “solely,” “exclusively,” or 
“primarily” to ensure that only purely commercial speech was hindered 
by the statute.111  Absent these limitations in the statutory construction of 
the ordinance, the Ninth Circuit found that there was a substantial 
likelihood that the ordinance would inhibit the expression of fully 
protected speech intertwined with commercial speech.112  The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the term “off-premises canvassing” included fully 
protected expression and would have prohibited the distribution of 
newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and other publications that contain 
some form of commercial advertising.113  Section 201.430(2) is 
unconstitutionally overbroad because the language of the statute 
intertwines both commercial and noncommercial speech. 
3. Nevada Revised Statutes Section 201.430(2) Is Unconstitutionally 
Overbroad
Section 201.430(2) is overbroad because it encompasses newspaper 
articles and other fully protected types of speech.114  Speech that is 
noncommercial is generally entitled to full protection under the 
Constitution.115  Newspaper articles and reviews are usually not 
considered advertising for commercial speech purposes because they 
lack an economic incentive for engaging in the speech and do not 
propose a commercial transaction.116  Thus, such publications are 
granted full protection under the First Amendment, and any restriction 
that inhibits noncommercial speech is subject to strict scrutiny.117  While 
section 201.430(2) targets commercial speech, the restriction is  
111 Id. at 1143-44. 
112 Id. at 1144. 
113 Id.
114 See generally id.
115 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) 
(stating that the Constitution provides lesser protections to commercial speech than other forms of 
expression); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (stating that the 
most exacting scrutiny standard applies to regulations that suppress speech because of its content). 
116 See, e.g., S.N.J. Newspapers, Inc. v. State of N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 542 F. Supp. 173, 182-
83 (D.N.J. 1982) (stating that the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of the press protect 
newspapers); Ad World, Inc. v. Twp. of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (3d Cir. 1983); see
also Hays Cnty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a free 
newspaper that dealt with environmental and social justice issues was fully constitutionally protected 
speech even though its publication expenses were covered in part by revenue derived from 
advertisers).
117 See Worrell Newspapers of Ind., Inc. v. Westhafer, 739 F.2d 1219, 1221-22 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
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o the brothel.
constitutionally overbroad because the statute also restricts 
noncommercial speech.118
As discussed above, section 201.430(2) contains language that 
inhibits certain types of noncommercial speech, such as newspaper 
articles that cover the brothel industry.  In Coyote Publishing, the Ninth 
Circuit addressed a New York Times article used by the plaintiffs as an 
example where section 201.430(3) would inhibit noncommercial 
speech.119  The article featured a picture of a legal brothel and revealed 
the brothel’s web address and phone number.120  The court determined 
that section 201.430(3) did not burden any significant amount of fully 
protected speech because section 201.430(1) prohibits only brothel 
owners or persons acting on behalf of brothel owners from 
advertising.121  However, section 201.430(2), which regulates unlicensed 
brothels, does inhibit fully protected speech because it does not apply 
solely to brothel owners and those acting on behalf of brothels.122  If the 
New York Times article had instead featured an illegal brothel as 
opposed to a legal brothel, the article would be considered an unlawful 
advertisement under Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) 
because it publicizes the telephone number and identifies a way to obtain 
directions t 123
Additionally, section 201.430(2) uses language insufficient to 
ensure that noncommercial speech, such as a newspaper publication, is 
not intertwined with commercial speech.  Just as the ordinances in 
S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark did not ensure that only purely 
commercial speech was restricted, section 201.430(2) contains no 
118 The Constitution gives substantial protection from overbroad laws that chill First 
Amendment speech. See United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that a statute 
is unconstitutional on its face if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech); see also Hous. 
Balloons & Promotions, LLC v. City of Hous., 589 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (holding 
that the overbreadth doctrine is not applicable to a commercial speech case unless the challenged 
regulation potentially inhibits noncommercial speech as well as commercial speech); King Enters., 
Inc. v. Thomas Twp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (stating that for noncommercial 
speech, regulation is overbroad if it reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
speech).
119 Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592, 598 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 1556 (2011). 
120 Steve Friess, Brothels Ask to Be Taxed, But Official Sees a Catch, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/us/26brothel.html. 
121 Id.; see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(3) (Westlaw 2011).  The relevant portion of the 
statute that inhibits this article states, “Inclusion . . . of the . . . location or telephone number of a 
house of prostitution . . . constitutes prima facie evidence of advertising for the purposes of this 
section.”
122 See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011). 
123 See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2) (Westlaw 2011). 
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limiting language on its face.124  Sections 201.430(2) and 201.430(3) 
provide that it is unlawful to print an advertisement concerning an 
unlicensed brothel and that inclusion in any publication of their address, 
location, or telephone number constitutes prima facie evidence of 
advertising.125  These sections of the statute lack any phrases, such as 
“solely or exclusively commercial transactions” as the court articulated 
in S.O.C., Inc., to ensure that the application of this statute does no more 
than restrict purely commercial transactions.126  Absent these limitations 
in the construction of Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2), the 
statute will encompass noncommercial speech, such as newspapers, 
pamphlets, magazines, Internet blogs, and other mediums of expression.  
Although statutes that regulate purely commercial speech are generally 
not subject to an overbreadth analysis, Nevada Revised Statutes section 
201.430(2) also encompasses noncommercial speech.127  Therefore, an 
overbreadth analysis should be applied to section 201.430(2) and the 
statute should be deemed unconstitutionally overbroad. 
B. STRICT SCRUTINY SHOULD BE USED TO ANALYZE NEVADA
REVISED STATUTES SECTION 201.430(2)
Section 201.430(2) inhibits more than just purely commercial 
speech and requires a strict scrutiny analysis as opposed to the Central 
Hudson standard.  While the Ninth Circuit in Coyote Publishing 
refrained from analyzing section 201.430(2) since it did not apply to the 
facts of the case, the court determined that section 201.430(1) was 
subject to a modified intermediate level of scrutiny because the statute 
regulated only commercial speech.128  Section 201.430(2) on the other 
hand restricts fully protected First Amendment speech, such as 
newspaper articles and Internet blogs, thus requiring a strict scrutiny 
analysis. 
The Ninth Circuit in Coyote Publishing noted that section 
201.430(1) prohibits only brothel owners, or persons “acting on behalf 
of” brothel owners, from advertising.129  As a result, the Ninth Circuit 
124 S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 201.430 (Westlaw 2011). 
125 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(2)-(3) (Westlaw 2011). 
126 S.O.C., Inc., 152 F.3d at 1143-44. 
127 See generally Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
496-97 (1982); United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1309 (D. Utah 2003). 
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held that a publisher of a news account would not be held liable under 
section 201.430(1).130  While section 201.430(1) prohibits people acting 
on behalf of a brothel to advertise in public places,131 section 201.430(2) 
does not mention the words “acting on behalf of” a brothel owner 
because the statute regulates unlicensed brothels.132  Instead, section 
201.430(2) inhibits any publisher, not just those acting on behalf of a 
brothel, from publishing articles about unlicensed brothels.133  Based on 
the construction of this statute, newspapers and other publishers could be 
subject to criminal sanctions even though they were not acting on behalf 
of a legal brothel.  The statute inhibits fully protected speech such as 
newspapers, Internet blogs and other mediums of news sources, and thus 
requires a strict scrutiny analysis. 
1. Nevada Revised Statutes Section 201.430(2) Should be Subject to 
Strict Scrutiny Analysis 
Section 201.430(2) inhibits noncommercial speech and should be 
analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard.  Speech is “commercial” if it 
does no more than propose a commercial transaction.134  When a law 
interferes with a fundamental right, such as free speech, the court must 
review the legislation with strict scrutiny.135  Advertising regulations 
targeting commercial speech, but also interfering with fully protected 
types of speech, do not meet the “no more than” standard and should not 
be analyzed using the Central Hudson standard.136
As discussed above, section 201.430(2) restricts noncommercial 
speech found in newspaper articles and Internet blogs.  Such publications 
are not considered advertising for commercial speech purposes and are 
granted full First Amendment protections.137  Since section 201.430(2) 
130 Id.
131 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(1) (Westlaw 2011). 
132 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(1), (2) (Westlaw 2011). 
133 Compare NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(1) (Westlaw 2011), with NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 201.430(3) (Westlaw 2011). 
134 See generally Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1017 (9th Cir. 
2004); Complete Angler, LLC v. City of Clearwater, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 2009); 
Volkswagen AG v. Dorling Kindersley Publ’g, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 793, 809-10 (E.D. Mich. 2009); 
Hous. Balloons & Promotions, LLC v. City of Hous., 589 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2008). 
135 See Miller v. Murphy, 191 Cal. Rptr. 740, 743–44 (Ct. App. 1983); Harrold v. Collier, 836 
N.E.2d 1165, 1171 (Ohio 2005). 
136 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). 
137 See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 (1988) (stating that 
the economic motivation of a newspaper to sell copies does not render the article’s commercial 
speech deserving of less stringent constitutional protection). 
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regulates types of noncommercial speech, it does not meet the “no more 
than” criteria accepted by the Ninth Circuit.138  Consequently, Nevada 
Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) is subject to a strict scrutiny analysis 
as opposed to the Central Hudson test. 
2. Nevada Revised Statutes Section 201.430(2) Would Fail a Strict 
Scrutiny Analysis 
Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) would be invalid under 
a strict scrutiny analysis because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest.  It is substantially more difficult for a statute to 
be constitutionally valid when analyzed under strict scrutiny—the most 
exacting standard—than when analyzed under the Central Hudson
test.139  Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the government must 
demonstrate that the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve the 
compelling state interest in limiting the commodification of sex.140
The government has the burden of proving that there is a 
compelling state interest, not just a substantial interest, to justify Nevada 
Revised Statutes section 201.430(2).141  To conclude that a compelling 
interest exists, a court must find a relatively high degree of government 
concern to justify the particular invasion of the constitutional right.142
Examples of compelling government interests include protecting the 
physical well being of minors and protecting national security.143  The 
universe of interests a court can consider compelling to justify 
restrictions on free speech is extraordinarily limited.144  Here, there are 
compelling interests to justify Nevada Revised Statutes section 
201.430(2), including the protection of children from being exposed to 
advertisements for unlicensed brothels.  Decreasing prostitution is also a 
compelling governmental interest.145  However, even if the government 
could demonstrate a compelling state interest, section 201.430(2) would 
138 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 
(1976). 
139 Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, LLC v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., No. 
09CA1230, 2010 WL 1492308 (Colo. App. Apr. 15, 2010), cert. granted, 2010 WL 4159242 (Colo. 
Oct. 18, 2010). 
140 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
141 Id.
142 Robinson v. City of Seattle, 10 P.3d 452, 467 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
143 See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Haig v. Agee, 453 
U.S. 280, 307 (1981). 
144 See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns, 492 U.S. at 126. 
145 See, e.g., Frieling v. State, 67 S.W.3d 462, 474 (Tex. App. 2002); State v. Mueller, 671 
P.2d 1351, 1354 (Haw. 1983), State v. Davis, 623 So.2d 622, 624 (Fla. App. 1993). 
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nevertheless fail a strict scrutiny analysis because it is not narrowly 
tailored.
Section 201.430(2) is not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling 
state interest because it restricts noncommercial speech protected by the 
First Amendment.  If the law encompasses too much or too little to 
advance this compelling interest, it will fail the “narrowly tailored” 
requirement.146  A regulation that infringes upon First Amendment rights 
will be sustained only if the regulation is narrowly tailored and if it does 
not excessively intrude upon the exercise of First Amendment 
freedoms.147  In Association of Community Organizations for Reform 
Now v. City of Frontenac, a nonprofit organization brought suit claiming 
the city of Frontenac’s ordinance that restricted door-to-door solicitation 
was unconstitutional.148  The city of Frontenac argued that the ordinance 
was necessary to protect the security and privacy of Frontenac 
residents.149  The court held that although the city’s objectives to reduce 
crime were legitimate, the regulation was not sufficiently tailored to 
avoid conflict with the nonprofit organization’s First Amendment 
freedoms.150  The court noted that the government failed to demonstrate 
that its objectives would not be served by less restrictive alternatives.151
Similar to Frontenac, Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) 
is not narrowly tailored because the government’s objectives should be 
reached by means that do not restrict noncommercial speech.  Although 
there are compelling interests, such as eliminating illegal brothels and 
prostitution, section 201.430(2) encompasses too much speech because it 
also prohibits periodicals and articles that feature noncommercial speech 
protected by the First Amendment.  As a result, Nevada Revised Statutes 
section 201.430(2) would fail a strict scrutiny analysis because it is not 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 
CONCLUSION
In Coyote Publishing, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a situation 
where newspaper publishers challenged the validity of statutes that 
regulated advertising of legal brothels.152  The court consequently held 
146 Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 201 (6th Cir. 2010). 
147 Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 
1983). 
148 Id. at 815-16. 
149 Id. at 816. 
150 Id. at 818. 
151 Id.
152 Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1556 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss1/9
2011] Coyote Publishing, Inc. v. Miller 125 
that Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(1), which restricts 
advertising of licensed brothels, was constitutional.153  However, had the 
facts of the case pertained to publications of unlicensed brothels instead 
of licensed brothels, section 201.430(2) would have applied. Nevada 
Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) is an unconstitutional restriction on 
free speech because it regulates commercial as well as noncommercial 
speech.  As a result, section 201.430(2) is overbroad and is subject to a 
strict scrutiny analysis as opposed to the more lenient Central Hudson
test.  Nevada Revised Statutes section 201.430(2) would consequently 
fail a strict scrutiny analysis and is therefore unconstitutional. 
2011). 
153 Id. at 611. 
21
Wolfe: Coyote Publishing, Inc. v. Miller
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
